Modification in Elliptic Curve Cryptography based Mutual authentication scheme for smart grid communication using biometric approach

Modification in Elliptic Curve Cryptography based Mutual authentication scheme for smart grid communication using biometric approach

Shivali^1*,   Meenakshi²

^1*,2Srinivasa Ramanujan Department of Mathematics, Central University of Himachal Pradesh,

Dharmshala, 176215, Himachal Pradesh, India

ABSTRACT:

Smart grid is a self-sufficient system.  That tracks how the energy is used from its source to its final destination. The smart grid can increase the service quality while reducing the consumption of electricity. However, the safety and confidentiality of information/data is the major challenge in smart grid environment. To overcome this there are numerous authentication procedures that have been documented. The mutual authentication system for the smart grid that is based on elliptic curve cryptography and biometrics was thus introduced by A.A. Khan et al.’s. This protocol is secure from various attacks. But we found an inability of password and biometric updating phase. Therefore we provided the password and biometric updating phase in this protocol.

1.  INTRODUCTION:

As the advancement of network technology and electrical technology smart grid plays an important role. In the past, smart grid used to deliver electricity to consumers homes and it is one-way transmission. But as the increasing power demands of 21^st century it is difficult for one-way smart grid system to respond. Hence the two-way smart grid is introduced. In bidirectional smart grid system both electricity and information can interchange between the server and consumers. The smart grid system contains smart apparatus, grid sub-stations, phasor measurement and information transfers. Smart meters are used in smart grid system by smart equipments to exchange data with the server and the user. Additionally user inquiries are sent to substations via smart meters. Substations that received inquiries pass them to the control center, which then deals with the user’s problems. In order to guarantee secure connection between users and substations while transmitting data safely and dependably, a number of authentication protocol have been established. However, these protocols have several limitations, such as the fact they cannot withstand certain attacks. Therefore, in a smart grid system authentication protocol is needed to secure this communication. Thus, cryptographic protocols are crucial to achieving a smart grid system’s security and privacy. For smart grid system there are several schemes such as Biometric-based authentication scheme by Li and Hwang in 2010 [9]. In 2011 Mostafa M.F. et al. gave a simple message authentication mechanism for smart grid communication, which is based on the hash-based authentication code [10]. Further Chim et al. introduced a confidentiality-conserving authentication system for smart grid, in 2011. They use a privacy-preserving authentication technique employing pseudo identities and anti-counterfeit component at the slick instruments [11]. W.S. Juang et al. also gave a strong and effective smart card-based password-authenticated key agreement [13]. They makes significant advances by addressing the risk of smart card loss and by using elliptical curve methods to lower implementation cost and also states about the password updating phase. In 2009 D.-Z.Sun et al. introduced an improvement of password-authenticated key agreement using smart card [2]. In 2019, Km Renuka et al gave a decryption and development of a 3-factor authentication mechanism for wireless sensor systems that protects confidentiality. [4]. They examine the safety of a privacy-protection multi-factor authentication scheme for wireless sensor network. They also discuss the password and biometric updating phase. For application in a smart grid, H.P. Singh et al recommended the creation of a 3-factor user authentication system [12]. They revisit Wazid et al scheme and they states about the password updating phase. In 2021 D. Kaur et al. gave the decryption and development of a 2-factor authentication system for smart homes [3]. They also discuss the password updating phase. In 2021, A.A. Khan et al. gave a simple architecture for key establishment and authentication for the power grid [5]. They use random oracle model and also discuss the password and biometric updating phase in the protocol. Lastly, in 2017 Li et al. gave public key infrastructure based on network authentication mechanism for smart areas and buildings [8]. However, the expenses of processing are substantially higher.    

1.1. Motivation:

To the best of our knowledge, the mutual authentication system for the smart grid that is based on ECC and biometrics requires a password and biometric updating phase. The biological and password update phase has been implemented into even the other authentication mechanisms. These factors inspire us to introduce the A.A. Khan protocol’s biological and password update phase. The user can update or modify their biometric and password during this step.

1.2. Arrangement of a document:

The following is the order of a document: The fundamental representations utilized in this document are defined in part-2. After that, we review the A.A. Khan protocol’s, in part-3. The part-4 is covered with the security evaluation of A.A. Khan’s scheme.  In section 5, we discuss our contribution and lastly we provide a conclusion.   

2. Preliminaries:

This section provides the helpful notation and mathematical terms needed to understand the proposed scheme.

2.1. Fuzzy extractor and biometric:

The biometric information can be converted into a string of randomly generated characters with the help of fuzzy extractor and biometric are use to identifying the identity of user by using his/her fingerprints, face scan, voice recognition and iris scan.

2.2. Table:

Notations and their definition.

·                     Gen:

A confidential data key σ_i ϵ {0,1}^l and a common procreation variable τ_i, are produced using a statistical technique that accepts a biometric input of B_i ϵ Ɲ, where Gen(B_i) = {σ_i, τ_i}.