Cryptanalysis of LSPA-SGs: A lightweight and secure protocol for authentication and key agreement based Elliptic Curve Cryptography in smart grids

Cryptanalysis of LSPA-SGs: A lightweight and secure protocol for authentication and key agreement based Elliptic Curve Cryptography in smart grids

Publish, Meenakshi

Srinivasa Ramanujan Department of Mathematics, Central University of Himachal Pradesh,

Dharamshala (176215), India

ABSTRACT:

Smart grids are becoming more and more significant as more nations adopt the smart city concept and boost energy sector efficiency to create a more sustainable and secure  future. However, it is critical to address the security issues with smart grids. Security and privacy are essential components of SG communication. Recently, the LSPA-SGs scheme was created, and according to its creators, it is an effective and secure protocol. We reviewed their scheme and observed that it does not provide security and privacy. It contain some security vulnerabilities; user anonymity, stolen-verifier attack, password guessing attack, physical attack, privileged insider attack, user impersonation attack. This study exposed the weaknesses of Susan A. Mohammed et al design's and demonstrated how many security issues allowed for powerful attacks.

1 INTRODUCTION:

The first AC electric grid was built in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, in 1886 [1]. In this period, the distribution, transmission, and demand-driven regulation of energy were all handled by a single, consolidated grid. Local grids in the 20^th century expanded throughout time and finally joined for practical and reliable reasons. Daily peaks in demand caused by residential heating and cooling were addressed by a variety of high-power generators that were only turned on briefly each day. Due to the low utilization of these peaking generators and the need for grid redundancy, gas turbines were typically used, which have lower capital costs and faster start up times. The electrical providers were hit with significant expenses as a result, which were subsequently passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. This electrical grid was not fulfilling the demands of 20^th century populations due to a lack of natural gas, coal, water, and various fossil fuels, for which we had to introduce modern technology so that the electrical grid would become smarter. A better electrical power grid, a "smart grid," works with infrastructure communication technology to distribute electricity more effectively and to communicate with users and power communication providers. The 20th century's constantly evolving and expanding power needs cannot be met by the existing power grid architecture, making efficient power grid utilization essential today [1]. Among its many benefits, the smart grid allows for better management and expansion of renewable energy sources. Rapid advancements in communication and information technology in recent years have resulted in secure and ongoing technological advancements [2]. Just a few of the options it provides for developing a growing intelligent platform include power control, internet communication, and smart meters [3, 4]. A platform called SG enables two-way contact between users and service providers on a regular basis for computation and communication [5]. SG may be suspended from cyberattacks due to its sensitivity [6]. Physical attacks, cyberattacks, and natural disasters pose the greatest risks to the deployment of smart grids since they can result in blackouts, infrastructure failure, consumer data breaches, energy theft, and the safety of operating personnel, among other things [7]. As a result, extensive research is being done to increase the security of smart grids [8]. In order to provide solutions that are resistant to cyber-attacks in smart grid applications, security measures are essential [9, 10]. The smart grid security issue needs to be taken care of immediately. It is crucial to provide SG with a safe and secure authentication system that maintains trust between genuine users and satisfies other security requirements like anonymity authentication and privacy.

2. RELATED WORK:

Several models are being used in current study. The foundation for HAN and BAN authentication was created in 2011 by Fouda et al. This system uses exponential operations and time-consuming procedures like public key encoding and decoding. Weizheng Wang et al. created their system in 2011 by combining block chain technology with ECC. Khan proposed the PALAK smart grid system in 2020 [16], which is a unique system. They talked about a lot of PALK's security features and attack resilience. An efficient and secure design between the user and the utility centre was what Moghadam et al. sought to achieve in 2020 with their design for key agreement and authentication. Li et al. [13] created an anonymous authentication system for SG architects. The sender's identity and the multiplication of two points over the curve are both unknowns during the login and verification phase of the PALK system, SA Chaudhary [17] showed in 2021.Some smart grid-connected devices are unable to finish  a single authentication cycle as a result of the weaknesses in this protocol. Scheme [17] proposes an immediate remedy for the significant problems of the palak. However, [17] overlooked a few issues that may have been  fixed in  LSPA-SGs   [18] . Consequently, we provided the LSPA-SGs [18] cryptanalysis  in this work.

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER:

The paragraphs that make up the framework of the paper are as follows: Section 4 revisits the  [18]    system, and   Section 5    addresses its shortcomings. We summarize our conclusions in the final part.

Table 1   The meaning of the symbols

4. THE BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SUSAN SCHEME:

Step 1:

The UA enters his identification (Id), password (Pw).Computes N and A, respectively, as well as P and verifies A_A =?A. U_A sets timestamp T₁ and sends "A_A,N_A, T₁" to U_B over public channel if the verification step is successful.

Step 2:

After receiving A_A, N_A, and T₁, the U_B sets timestamp T₂ and tests its freshness using the relation | T₂-T₁ |≤ ∆T. If this is successful, the U_B chooses a random number, g_B, and computes G_B= g_B.P, K_B = g_B.(A_A+PK_T+N_A.PK_T), SK_BA = h(g_B.A_A||T₂||q_B), and Aut_B = h(SK_BA||q_B). Now, U_B uses computed key K_B to encrypt E_B = ENC_KB (q_B||T₂). Finally, U_B transmits to U_A "E_B, G_B, Aut_B, T₂".

Step 3:

U_A sets timestamp T₃, and upon success, computes K_A = SK_A.G_B and decrypts DEC(E_B)_KA = (q_B, T₂) to determine whether the timestamp is fresh. In addition, U_A calculates SK_AB=h(N_A.G_B||T₂||q_B), Aut_A = h(SK_AB||qB), and confirm Aut_A =? Aut_B. In the event that the verification is successful, U_A chooses the random number X_A, computes F_A = h(Aut_A||X_A), and then encrypts E_A = ENC_KA(F_A||X_A) using the computed key K_A. Then, U_A uses a public channel to send "E_A, F_A, T₃" to U_B.

Step 4:

After receiving E_A, F_A, and T₃ from U_A, U_B sets timestamp T₄ and, upon success, determines if the timestamp is current using the relation | T₄- T₃|≤ ∆T, DEC(E_A)_KB = (Aut_A, X_A). The authentication and session key are therefore successful if U_B calculates F_B = h (Aut_A||X_A) and then verifies F_B =? F_A.

Password change phase:

The user provides his ID and PW_i of choice in the registration process. After entering its ID, for example, entity A, one of the entities will then proceed. Using PW_A, the parameters N_A = h(Id_A||PW_A||a_A) and A_A = N_A.P are calculated. Then, the verification between A_A’ and A_A is checked. Then the user enters his or her new password, say "PW_A," and computes the relationships N_A = h(Id_A||PW_A||a_A) and A_A = N_A.P. If the computation is successful, Finally, parameter A_A’ takes the place of parameter A_A in the target entity's memory.

5. THE CRYPTANALYSIS OF SUSAN SCHEME:

This section demonstrates some security flaws discovered in the technique, including privileged insider, stolen verifies, password guessing, user impersonation, user anonymity, and password modification attacks.

5.1   Privileged insider:

In the literature, there are several schemes that demonstrate the viability of privileged insider attacks, as we stated in the security models. Therefore, the insider attack is practically valid in Susan's system. Because in the registration phase, U_i sends Id_i, N_i to TA via secure channels. Then malicious insider might obtaining the information i.e N_i , Id_i. and also extract the parameter x_A, A_i from the memory using side channel attack. A can guess PWD_i of U_i.

5.2 Password guessing attack:

Input the values of x_i and Id_i in N_i =h(Id_i||PW_i||x_i), then the attacker guess the password by inputing the variable values to equating it with N_i value and thus, the  output is correct password PWD_i of U_i. In this way, Attacker can register himself/herself with U_i’s Id_i and PWD_i.      

5.3 User impersonation attack:

Suppose A uses side channel attacks to obtain Idi and PWD_i in addition to the parameters xi, Ai, and other information from the memory. Attacker A calculates N_i = h(Id_i||PW_i||x_i) by first creating a random number yi in place of xi. Then through secure channel A send Id_i , N_i to TA . After receiving Id_i, N_i; TA computes A_i =N_i.P, C_i=PK_T +A_i, hc_i =h(C_i), ms_i = Pr_T +hc_i*Pr_T and SK_i = N_i +ms_i. TA sends C_i, PK_T, SK_i to U_i through secure channel. As a result of the judgement above, we can conclude that A uses a computer in a legal manner.

5.4 Password change phase:

The user first completes the registration process by entering the ID and PW of his choice. As of right now, A has entered his PW and ID, calculated N_i* and A_i*, and verified that A_i*=A_i. If successful (obviously), A enters its new password, i.e., Pwi**, computes all of these parameters (A_i**, N_i**), and replaces the parameters A_A in the target entity's memory.

6. CONCLUSION:

In this study, we performed cryptanalysis on the Susan scheme and discovered a number of significant flaws that let attackers launch powerful attacks such as impersonation attack, password guessing attacks, privileged insider attacks, and password change attacks. To address these issues, we must encrypt that value, which is kept in the database (memory card). Attackers who gain access to the memory card will be unable to use the relation N_i=h(id_i||PW_i||a_i) to determine the password of the desired user. If so, this approach is secure and also works with smart grid systems.

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